Responsa for Bava Batra 296:4
אמר רב יוסף בר מניומי אמר רב נחמן שכיב מרע שכתב כל נכסיו לאחרים רואין אם במחלק מת קנו כולן עמד חוזר בכולן
[if] he recovered he may withdraw in [the case of] all of them.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Because he left nothing for himself, in which case, as stated in our Mishnah, he may withdraw the gifts he made in the expectation of death. ');"><sup>9</sup></span> If, [however,] he did it after consideration,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., if his intention at first was not to give away all his estate, and only after giving a portion to one he reconsidered the matter and made the gifts to the others. ');"><sup>10</sup></span> [then if] he died, all of them acquire possession;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Even if no legal acquisition took place. since the verbal gift of a dying man is legally valid. ');"><sup>8</sup></span>
Teshuvot Maharam
Rabbi Perez took issue with Rabbi Meir quoting Alfasi's decision that the ordinance of Usha — which ruled that a person who divided all of his property among his children may derive his sustenance as well as that of his wife's from such property — was not accepted.
Rabbi Meir reproved Rabbi Perez for resorting to Alfasi when the Talmud specifically decided that the ordinance of Usha was not accepted. R. Meir contended, however, that only that part of the ordinance was not accepted which gave the right to the donor, and to his wife while he was alive, to derive their sustenance from the property he had given away; while the rule that the widow may collect her sustenance or her ketubah from such property after the donor's death, was accepted before the ordinance of Usha was promulgated, and has remained in force independently of such ordinance.
Meanwhile L's relatives have written to Rabbi Meir asking for his decsion in this matter. R. Meir answered that he usually refrained from sending legal opinions to litigants, or to their relatives, and confined his responses to judges. But, when Rabbi Perez, in his second letter, gave the names of the litigants, R. Meir realized that the letters from L's relatives dealt with the same case. R. Meir recalled that among these letters was found a letter from Rabbi Asher which explained the circumstances of the gift mentioned above. Therefore, R. Meir added (in his second letter to Rabbi Perez) that since according to Rabbi Asher's letter, the donor mentioned the contingency of death when he summoned Rabbi Asher, he therefore made the gift to his son causa mortis (cf. B. B. 151a), and a widow is undoubtedly entitled to collect her ketubah from causa mortis gifts.
SOURCES: Cr. 192; Am II, 46–7; cf. Hag. Maim. to Ishut 16, 4; Mord. Ket. 161. Cf. Agudah B.M. 29; Moses Minz, Responsa 66.